In this paper we develop likelihood based methods for statistical inference in a joint system of equations for the choice of length of schooling and earnings. The model for schooling choice is assumed to be an ordered probit model, whereas the earnings equation contains variables that are flexible transformations of schooling and experience, with corresponding coefficients that are allowed to be heterogeneous across individuals. Under the assumption that the distribution of the random terms of the model can be expressed as a particular finite mixture of multinormal distributions, we show that the joint probability distribution for schooling and earnings can be expressed on closed form. In an application of our method on Norwegian data, we find that the mixed Gaussian model offers a substantial improvement in fit to the (heavy-tailed) empirical distribution of log-earnings compared to a multinormal benchmark model.
Introduction
The relationship between schooling and earnings is one of the most frequently studied in empirical economics. A large number of these studies build upon versions of the earnings equation proposed by Mincer (1974) . A key parameter in the Mincer earnings equation is the coe¢ cient associated with years of schooling, intended to capture the e¤ect on earnings di¤erences caused by di¤erences in schooling. However, to give a causal interpretation of the parameters in the earnings equation, one must take into account that the independent variable "years of schooling" is endogenous because it is the outcome of a choice variable. The endogeneity problem is related to the fact that the econometrician does not observe all factors that a¤ect schooling choice. If some of these unobserved factors are correlated with unobservables in the earnings equation, OLS will produce biased estimates of the returns to schooling (ability bias).
Traditionally, ability bias is assumed to arise because of correlation between length of schooling and the additive error term in the earnings equation. If such correlation exists and is positive, it implies that people with high earnings capacity (irrespective of level of schooling) systematically choose a higher schooling level than people with low earnings capacity. In the literature, such heterogeneity is often termed "absolute advantage". Various econometric methods have been developed to deal with this problem, see Griliches (1977) for an overview of the early literature.
Several more recent econometric studies have also taken into account that there may be heterogeneity not only associated with general earning capacity, but also associated with returns to schooling: Some individuals gain more from an extra year of schooling than others, cf. for example the theoretical model of Willis and Rosen (1979) . Heterogeneity of this sort is often termed "comparative advantage", and is typically dealt with by formulating a random coe¢ cient model, in which the coe¢ cient associated with years of schooling is allowed to vary across individuals according to some distribution function. If this random coe¢ cient is correlated with the schooling variable or the additive error term in the earnings equation, then standard OLS estimates of returns to schooling will be biased.
To deal with ability bias and endogeneity of schooling, instrumental variable approaches have often been applied. As a result, there is now a substantial literature on how to interpret instrumental variable estimates in the case of heterogeneity in returns to schooling. See for example Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) , Wooldridge (2002) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) . A somewhat closely related approach is the so-called two-stage-or control function approach. In this approach a choice-ofschooling equation is estimated in the …rst stage from which suitable variables are computed. In a second stage, these variables are used as additional regressors in the earnings equation, to account for the correlations between the schooling variable and the error terms, see Heckman (1979) and Garen (1984) . Card (2001) gives an overview of these approaches to estimating earnings relations in the presence of individual heterogeneity in the returns to schooling.
In addition to the focus on di¤erent types of selection biases there has been a growing attention to the speci…cation of the Mincer equation in the literature.
One of the most important features of the Mincer equation is that log earnings is assumed to be linear in years of schooling, while another is the assumed separability between schooling and experience. Several papers, e.g. Heckman and Polachek (1974) , Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) and Belzil (2007) have examined the validity of -and the consequences of relaxing -these and other functional form assumptions of the standard Mincer framework. A general …nding is that some of the simplifying assumptions are rejected, and hence that there is need for a framework that accommodates more ‡exibility.
Several authors have incorporated a structural, discrete choice dynamic programming approach to model schooling and related labor market decisions. Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate a dynamic human capital investment model of schooling-, employment-and occupation-decisions, where skill heterogeneity and hence selfselection plays a role in all three choices. Belzil and Hansen (2002a) estimate a dynamic programming model where individuals di¤er in market and schooling ability, and relax the assumption of constant marginal returns to schooling. They …nd clear evidence of ability bias, and, perhaps more importantly, that the (log) wageschooling relationship is highly non-linear, so that "...estimation methods that do not allow for a ‡exible estimation of the local returns to schooling will lead to unreliable estimates of both the local and the average return to schooling." Belzil and Hansen (2007) estimate a model with both absolute and comparative advantage (a correlated random coe¢ cient wage regression model) within a dynamic programming framework. Belzil (2007) provides a thorough review of structural approaches to estimating the returns to schooling. He also compares this approach to the instrumental variables approach, and discusses commonalities and di¤erences. On this latter point, see also Keane (2005) .
The approach developed in this paper is, from the perspective of structural choice modelling, more modest than the dynamic programming setting. Speci…cally, in line with other works dating back to Cameron and Heckman (1998), we represent schooling choice by a simple stochastic index function that yields an ordered probit model. The idea of approximating individual schooling choices by a semi-structural model dates back to Cameron and Heckman (1998) . The ordered model accounts for forward-looking behavior and unobserved heterogeneity. However, by essentially modelling schooling choice as a static decision, an implicit assumption is that all future uncertainty is observed initially. Since the focus of our analysis is on the associated earnings relation, a structural dynamic schooling choice model does not seem necessary. In contrast, if the purpose is to analyze schooling choices per se, then a structural dynamic choice model is of interest.
In our study the earnings relation is rather general and ‡exible, both with respect to assumptions about the distribution of unobserved variables, functional forms, and the correlation structure of the random coe¢ cients. As a result, we are able to allow for two types of self-selection into schooling; namely selection by "absolute advantage" (correlation between schooling and the additive error term in the earnings equation) and selection by "comparative advantage"(correlation between schooling and the random coe¢ cients associated with the returns to schooling and experience).
Our approach o¤ers several advantages over the traditional two-stage, control function approach. First, since estimation is carried out in one stage, we do not have to worry about biased estimates of the standard errors. Such biases may arise because of imputation of parameters estimated in the …rst-stage and because, conditional on the individual's choice, the error term is heteroscedastic. Second, our approach allows us to deal with non-linear transformations of earnings, schooling and experience that may contain unknown parameters (such as in Box-Cox transformations), as well as random components that can be represented as mixtures of normally distributed random variables. Third, our approach makes it easy to test interesting hypotheses by means of the likelihood ratio test, whereas in the two-stage method exact testing will be cumbersome.
Our framework has many similarities with Carneiro et al. (2003) , who consider a setting with one probit model for the schooling choice and several measurement equations, with mixed multinormally distributed random components. Their estimation strategy is based on a particular Bayesian approach which requires Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. In contrast, we show that when the random components are mixed multinormally distributed one can express the corresponding likelihood function on closed form and derive explicit formulas for several types of treatment e¤ects.
A key issue in the recent literature on returns to schooling (and more generally in the program evaluation literature), is the discussion of how key structural parameters associated with the returns to schooling can be identi…ed. The strategy in the IV/experimentalist literature is to search for valid exclusion restrictions, where the excluded variables are the source of exogenous variation in the level of schooling.
On the other hand, the structural literature relies more explicitly on parametric assumptions ("identi…cation by functional form"). We emphasize that also within our framework interpretation of the results depends on exclusion restrictions, although such restrictions are not formally needed to obtain identi…cation.
In an application of our method on Norwegian data, it is con…rmed that selection e¤ects due to unobservables are important when analyzing the returns to schooling.
Speci…cally, we …nd a signi…cant positive correlation between the error term of the schooling choice equation and the random coe¢ cient of schooling in the earnings equation, and a signi…cant negative correlation between the additive error term of the schooling choice equation and the additive error term of the earnings equation. Moreover, our study shows, similar to Heckman and Polachek (1974) , that, for all practical purposes, the speci…cation with logarithm of earnings …ts the data best (within the class of Box-Cox transformations). Regarding the transformation of the independent variables, we …nd that piecewise linear functions of "length of schooling"and of "experience"give better …t and also substantially di¤erent results than generalized Box-Cox transformations (Box-Cox transformations with arbitrary translations). While allowance for mixed normally distributed error terms is essential for obtaining a good …t to the empirical distributions of log earnings (given di¤erent levels of schooling), many of our results are quite robust with respect to the speci…cation of the error distribution, including the estimated marginal returns to schooling as a function of years of schooling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the modeling framework and derive several results that enable us to carry out empirical inferences.
In Section 3 we present the empirical application, while Section 4 concludes the paper.
The modelling framework
In this section we specify the modelling framework for estimating the earnings equation and the choice of schooling relation. We …rst present a benchmark model with normally distributed error terms. We then extend this model to incorporate mixtures of normal distributions.
The basic model
We follow Cameron and Heckman (1998) in assuming a semi-structural probit model for the choice of length of schooling. From a choice theoretic perspective this model may be viewed a reduced form one, but it is semi-structural in the sense that it accounts for the hierarchical and discrete nature of the choice setting, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences 1 .
Let X be a latent index that represents the desired level of schooling on a continuous scale. The observed level of education, J, is a categorical variable with M possible categories; J 2 f1; 2; ::; M g. It is related to X through the relation
where f j g are unknown threshold values, except for 0 = 1 and M = 1.
The variable J represents the choice of level of schooling as constrained by the institutional schooling system, whereas X represents the individual's preferences with regard to the level of schooling on a continuous scale. The threshold values f j g determine the level of schooling in the institutional schooling system that corresponds to X .
Furthermore, we assume that
where Z 1 is a row-vector of exogenous variables a¤ecting the individual's choice of schooling (typically family background variables describing the situation prior to the choice of schooling), " 1 is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance and 1 is a …xed, unknown coe¢ cient vector. Thus, (1)- (2) speci…es a standard ordered probit model for the discrete choice variable J.
Consider now the earnings equation. Let T 1 (X 1 ; 1 ) be a transformation of years of schooling, X 1 ; and T 2 (X 2 ; 2 ) a transformation of labor market experience, X 2 .
By experience we mean age minus years of schooling minus seven years, i.e., potential experience. Each of the transformations T 1 (X 1 ; 1 ) and T 2 (X 2 ; 2 ) may be a BoxCox, polynomial, or spline function and possibly depend on unknown parameter vectors, 1 and 2 , respectively. Our earnings equation is given by
where is an unknown parameter to be estimated, X = (X 1 ; X 2 ) and T (X; ) = Let (X 1 ) be the function that assigns the schooling level that corresponds to X 1 years of schooling, i.e., J = (X 1 ). If ( ) is one-to-one, then X 1 = 1 (J) and X 2 =age X 1 7 (in this case ( ) is, in fact, redundant). However, it may be useful to have a framework which allows a given level of schooling to cover several possible values for X 1 . For example, one may want to assume (after initial exploration) that the self-selection is related to broader educational levels, such as short and long tertiary education, rather than actual years of schooling within these levels. For some speci…c years of schooling there may also be few observations. In our application in Section 3, the highest category of schooling (j = 8) covers the interval from 16 to 18 years of schooling. In that case, ( ) is not one-to-one. However, the actual realization of X 1 within the interval is assumed to be exogenous in the sense that the distribution of X 1 conditional on J is independent of the random terms " 1 ; " 2 and . Thus, in our application we ignore any selectivity issues related to the choice between, say, 16 and 17 years of schooling.
To denote the outcome of X given a particular level of schooling J = j, we use the notation X j . Thus X j may denote any value of X that is consistent with the choice J = j. Whereas X is an endogenous variable, X j is exogenous. For example,
given that J = j, X j 2 depends on age, which is exogenous.
Let Z denote the vector of all relevant exogenous variable of the model (including age and the variables in Z 1 and Z 2 ) and let
and = ( 1 ; 2 ) 0 . Then, we can write
where e " 2 and e are independent of " 1 , with mean zero and a general covariance matrix, . Let ( ) denote the standard normal c.d.f. and ( ) the corresponding density. We have the following result:
is multinormally distributed with zero mean and let be the covariance matrix of (e " 2 ; e 0 ),
and
If f (y; jjZ) denotes the joint density of (Y; J) given Z; then
The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows that the joint density of (Y; J) (conditional on Z) can be 
Extension to normal mixtures
Similarly to Carneiro et al. (2003) we now consider the case where the distribution of the error term in the earnings equation is a …nite mixture of normal distributions.
Moreover, this distribution is allowed to depend on the chosen level of schooling, J.
These extensions are highly relevant from an applied point of view. First, earnings data typically have heavy tails and may be skewed (also after applying appropriate transformations). Second, the shape of the earnings distribution may vary across di¤erent levels of schooling. Speci…cally, we assume in this section that the vector of error terms (" 1 ; " 2 ; 0 ) in the model analyzed in section 2.1 is replaced by
where, for …xed j and r, jr and jr are unknown scale and location parameters, respectively, and (" 1 (r); " 2 (r); (r) 0 ) is an i.i.d. vector with the same ("standardized") mean-zero multivariate normal distribution as (" 1 ; " 2 ; 0 ) (speci…ed in Section 2.1).
Equations (2) and (3) in Section 2.1. are then replaced, respectively, by
The above speci…cation means that "
is multinormally distributed. Now let f (y; jjZ; R = r) denote the joint density of earnings and chosen schooling level (Y; J), given Z and R = r. We then have the following result: 3 Tecnically it is possible to allow both " 1 (R) and (R) to be mixed Gaussian (similarly to " J 2 (R)). But this extension is hardly interesting from an empirical point of view, as the data reveal little (if anything) about the shapes of the distributions of these variables.
Corollary 2 Let (" 1 (r); " 2 (r); (r) 0 ), r = 1; 2; : : : ; Q, be i.i.d. multinormal random vectors with the same distribution as (" 1 ; " 2 , 0 ) for every r. Let R be a multinomially distributed random variable, independent of (" 1 (r); " 2 (r); (r) 0 ) for each r, with
Assume that in the model in Section 2.1, (2) and (3) are replaced
by (10) and (11), respectively, where " J 2 (R) is given by (9) . Then
where
The proof of the Corollary is given in Appendix A.
Consequently, the joint density of (Y; J) conditional on Z can be expressed as
We have thus shown that in the special case with only one outcome equation in addition to the choice equation, the likelihood function can be expressed on closed form also in the case when the distribution of the the error term in the earnings equation is a …nite mixture of normal distributions.
Our model can be seen as a (non-Bayesian) version of the model estimated in The factor structure and the distributional assumptions they impose on the random terms, coincide with the distributional assumptions made in this paper when there is only one measurement equation (i.e., the earnings equation), except that we allow more ‡exibility by letting the parameters in the distribution of " j 2 (r) also to be speci…c for each level of schooling, j. This extension raises speci…c identi…cation issues.
First, to obtain identi…cation of the intercept in (11), we assume that
q r jr = 0; for j = 1; :::; M .
Thus, E(" 
As seen from Corollary 3 below, (17) has the important implication that E("
is independent of k. Thus, a person who actually chooses J = j, will by assumption have the same expected value of the additive error term "
levels of schooling, k. The restriction (17) rules out that the idiosyncratic part of the marginal returns to schooling, which is assumed to be picked up by the random coe¢ cient (R), may be confounded by a shift in the mean of the additive error term, leading to obvious problems of identifying and interpreting our model.
Corollary 3 Under the assumptions of Corollary 2 and the restrictions in (16);
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in Appendix A.
From Corollary 3 and the additional restriction (17) , it follows that we can express (11) as
and the error term, " ; has the property that E(" jJ = j) = 0. Thus, if is known, it is possible to estimate , , 2 and consistently by a two-stage procedure in which (j) is obtained in a …rst stage probit analysis using data on schooling choices, whereas the earnings equation is estimated in a second stage by (a possibly nonlinear) least squares with (j) and (j)T (X; ) as additional regressors. Note that the coe¢ cients of these regressors do not depend on the mixing parameters. This is due to (17) . If (17) is not imposed, the coe¢ cient of (j) becomes P Q r=1 q r jr and hence depends on j. Thus (17) ensures that the mixing parameters only a¤ect the shape of the earnings distribution at di¤erent levels of schooling (variance, skewness, kurtosis, etc.), but not the causal e¤ects of schooling. Also note that despite the fact that there are several endogenous unobservables in the earnings equation, i.e., "
and (R), only one "control function", (j), is needed to control for selectivity bias.
De…nition of treatment e¤ects
When analyzing the implications of alternative schooling choices, it is of interest to calculate causal e¤ects (treatment e¤ects). The …rst is the average treatment e¤ect,
where the expression in the squared bracket is the change in the transformation of schooling, when years of schooling increases from x 1 to x. The second is the "e¤ect of the treatment on the treated", T T (x), given by
cf. (18), which has the interpretation of the marginal return of increasing years of schooling from x 1 to x for those who did in fact choose
(R)jJ = (x 1) = 0 due to (17) and Corollary 3, and hence does not enter the expression for T T (x).
The third e¤ect is the observed di¤erentials between levels of schooling, OD(x):
cf. (18) and (19) . This is the sum of (i) the average treatment e¤ect, (ii) the average of the idiosyncratic marginal returns to schooling for the individuals with this level of schooling and (iii) the average idiosyncratic earnings level e¤ect for the same individuals.
3 An empirical application on Norwegian data Linear:
When k = 1, x denotes years of schooling exceeding 7 years (which is the minimum value of X 1 in our data). When k = 2, x denotes potential experience, de…ned as age 
Results with normally distributed error terms
Estimation results for some key combinations of transformations of earnings, schooling and experience are displayed in Table 1 in the case with normally distributed error terms. A full set of results is reported in Tables 2-4 . When interpreting the results in Table 1 , it is important to bear in mind that the parameter estimates of 1 and 2 are not comparable across di¤erent models, as they are coe¢ cients of different transformations of schooling and experience. Moreover, whereas the models reported in the …rst three columns of Table 1 have log earnings as the dependent variable, the last column reports results from a speci…cation with a general Box-Cox transformation of earnings.
From Table 1 The estimated correlations between the stochastic terms have interesting economic interpretations and give information on the nature of self-selection. However, the pair-wise correlations reported in Table 1 show that many of these are not robust across di¤erent model speci…cations. For example, we …nd strong evidence of negative correlation between 2 and " 2 when = 0, but not at the maximum likelihood estimate = :17. However, with regard to the correlations that have the clearest economic interpretation we get quite striking results. First of all, it is evident that self-selection does matter. Concentrating henceforth on the results from the Box-Cox and spline transformations of schooling and experience, which overall
give the best …t to the data and the most plausible results, there are signi…cant negative correlations between " 1 and " 2 , i.e., the residual terms of the earnings and schooling equations. We also …nd strong positive correlations between 1 and " 1 .
Using spline transformations of x 1 and x 2 , we obtain correlation coe¢ cients of the same magnitude as for the Box-Cox transformations, regardless of whether = 0 or = :17. The robust …nding that Corr( 1 ; " 1 ) > 0 implies that individuals who have a high preference for schooling (conditional on the exogenous variables) also have high marginal returns to schooling. On the other hand, the …nding that Corr(" 1 ; " 2 ) < 0 means that if an individual with a high preference for schooling takes a short education, his earnings potential is lower than for an individual with the same education, but with a low preference for schooling. The correlations mentioned above have the interpretation of positive selection by comparative advantage and negative selection by absolute advantage, respectively. These patterns may also be interpreted as selection by di¤erent type of skills, with a high " 2 re ‡ecting high blue-collar skills, and a high " 1 re ‡ecting high white-collar skills. It should be kept in mind that the correlations reported in Table 1 depend on the respective speci…-cations and cannot be interpreted independently of the chosen transformations of length of schooling and experience.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the returns to schooling and experience, as seen from the estimated standard deviations SD( 1 ) and SD( 2 ) of 1 and 2 , respectively, which are of the same magnitude as the estimated …xed coe¢ cients, b minor implications for the estimated returns to experience. We see from Figure 3 that the Box-Cox speci…cation gives higher marginal returns for years of experience up to four to …ve years compared to the other speci…cations.
Concentrating on our preferred speci…cation, with spline transformations of both schooling and experience and with log earnings as the dependent variable in the earnings equation, Figure 4 depicts the three di¤erent kinds of marginal returns to schooling de…ned in Section 2.3. We see that the average e¤ect of the treatment on the treated (TT) in general is higher than the average treatment e¤ect (ATE).
This re ‡ects the positive correlation between " 2 and 1 that was reported in Table   1 : Individuals with higher (idiosyncratic) returns to schooling also invest more in schooling. Hence the marginal returns at a speci…c level are higher for those who actually have completed this level of schooling than for the average individual. In other words, there is selection by comparative advantage. On the other hand, we also estimated a negative correlation between " 1 and " 2 ; conditional on idiosyncratic returns to schooling, those with higher earnings potential regardless of schoolingall else equal -tend to choose a lower level of schooling. This is clearly seen from the earnings-schooling pro…les in Figure 1 . The self-selection related to " 2 gives a ‡atter pro…le, i.e., individuals with high " 2 tend to have low levels of schooling and vice versa.
To evaluate the …t of our preferred speci…cation, Figure 5 plots (i) the discrete probability density functions over a grid of 100 intervals, with equal width, for the estimated spline model with log earnings as the dependent variable, and (ii) histograms of the log earnings data. This is done conditional on the chosen level of schooling, i.e., for eight di¤erent levels. Note that the derived theoretical distributions are not normal. They are obtained from (8) , by integrating out (Z 1 ; Z 2 ) using the empirical distribution function of these covariates (given the level of schooling).
We see that the estimated model based on the normal distribution is unable to pick up the heavy tails that characterize the histograms in Figure 5 .
Results for the case with mixture distributions
We con…ne our analyses here to the case with ln Y as the dependent variable and with spline transformations of both years of schooling and years of experience. The results in Table 5 refer to the mixture model with Q = 2 and Q = 3, i.e., two and three mixture distributions, respectively. The new results are comparable to Model 3 in Table 1 , i.e., the (benchmark) model with normally distributed error terms and identical " 2 -distribution across levels of schooling. The benchmark model is a special case of a mixture model with Q = 1. Detailed results regarding the mixture parameters are given in Table 6 for the case with Q = 3. By comparing the nextto-last row in Table 1 and 5, we see a formidable increase in log-likelihood when we allow normal mixtures. When Q = 3 we obtain a log-likelihood which is 1600 points higher than the benchmark model with Q = 1 reported in Table 1 (Model 3). The increase in log-likelihood when going from Q = 2 to Q = 3 is also very large; about 230 points, at the cost of 17 additional parameters.
The estimated coe¢ cients of skewness and kurtosis in Table 5 for the error term
show clear evidence of non-normality. 4 The coe¢ cient of kurtosis is significantly above 3 in both models. When Q = 3 we obtain the highest coe¢ cient of kurtosis (about 6), thus indicating an aggregate earnings distribution (across schooling levels) with very heavy tails. Also the coe¢ cient of skewness is significantly di¤erent from zero according to the latter model, and the estimate (0.15 in both models) indicates a modest skewness to the right. Regarding the correlation coe¢ cients Corr(" J 2 (R); " 1 ) and Corr( 1 ; " 1 ), these have the same sign as in the benchmark model (Model 3) and they are both signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
The most interesting question is perhaps how the estimated returns to schooling are a¤ected when we allow normal mixtures. The answer is evident from …gures 6 and 7. The normal benchmark model (Model 3) and the two mixture models have estimated average returns to schooling (ATE) that are quite similar. The only notable di¤erence is that the two latter models exhibit about 2 percentage points lower ATE when years of schooling is less than or equal to 11 years, and 1-2 percentage points higher for 15-16 years of schooling. We see that the estimated 4 The results involving " Table 5 are obtained by simulations from the estimated distributions of " j (r), J and R.
returns to schooling is modestly a¤ected by whether we choose Q = 2 or Q = 3.
Concentrating henceforth on the mixture model with with Q = 3, Figure 7 depicts estimates of the three types of treatment e¤ects regarding the returns to schooling de…ned in Section 2.3. The graphs are quite similar to the corresponding graphs in Figure 4 , with normally distributed error terms. Again, we see that average e¤ect of the treatment on the treated (TT) in general is higher than the average treatment e¤ect (ATE). Note, however, that the di¤erences between the graphs in Figure 7 are generally smaller than between the corresponding graphs in Figure   4 . This is related to the fact that Corr(" J 2 (R); " 1 ) and Corr( 1 ; " 1 ) when Q = 3
(reported in Table 5 ) are smaller in magnitude than the corresponding correlations for Model 3 reported in Table 1 . Figure 8 reproduces Figure 5 in the case where the theoretical model depicted in Figure 5 is replaced by the normal mixture model with Q = 3. For all levels of schooling we see that the estimated conditional probability density functions …t the histograms of the log earnings data well. The improvement compared to Figure 5 is particularly striking for schooling levels 7 and 8, where the normal benchmark model …ts the data quite poorly (cf. Figure 5 , chart 7 and 8). A QQ-plot for the marginal distribution of log-earnings is presented in Figure 9 . The plot compares the empirical distribution function (the straight line) with the mixture model (Q = 3)
and the normal benchmark model (Q = 1). The overall impression from these graphs is that the depicted mixture model …ts the data well, and that a substantial improvement compared to the normal benchmark model is achieved. Similar graphs for the mixture model with Q = 2 reveal a somewhat poorer …t than when Q = 3, especially for schooling level 7 and 8, but we still get a clear improvement compared to the benchmark model.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed maximum likelihood estimation of a joint model for empirical distribution of the actual log-earnings data.
We believe that the econometric framework developed in this paper o¤ers several advantages to the researcher compared to the two-stage control function approach.
First, because it is a maximum likelihood approach based on the mixed Gaussian distribution, it o¤ers considerable ‡exibility. Second, it allows for nonlinear transformations of the dependent variable that contain unknown parameters. Third, biases due to heteroscedasticity and imputed estimates from the …rst stage that typically plague the control function approach no longer exist. Fourth, the maximum likeli-hood approach facilitates testing of alternative model speci…cations.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
Inserting (5) into (3) we obtain
Since J is independent of e " 2 and e , we have:
Var(T (X; )e + e " 2 jJ = j; Z) = Var(T (X j ; )e + e " 2 jZ)
using the de…nition of g( ) in (6). Given (" 1 , J; Z) we therefore obtain
Let
where 1(B) is the indicator function which is one if the event B is true and zero else. Since
we obtain from (24), using (25) with a = z T (X j ; )
Now, letting z = (y 1)= , we get dz = y 1 dy by the change-of-variables formula.
Hence the density in terms of untransformed earnings, y, becomes equal to (8) . This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Similarly to (5), we can write " 2 (r) = " 1 (r) + e " 2 (r), (r) = " 1 (r) + e (r);
where (e " 2 (r); e (r) 0 ) has covariance matrix and is independent of " 1 (r). Using (9) and (27), we then obtain
where e " j 2 (r) = jr e " 2 (r) is independent of " 1 (r) and the covariance matrix of (e " j 2 (r); e (r) 0 )
is jr (r) -de…ned in (14) . We realize that when R = r and J = j, the proof of Corollary 2 is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, with (" 1 ; " 2 ; 0 ) and (e " 2 ; e 0 ) now being replaced by (" 1 (r); " (6) is replaced by jr (r) (yielding (13)); and in (7) is replaced by jr (yielding (15)).
Proof of Corollary 3.
Recall that J = j , " 1 2 K j . Using the rule of double expectation and (27), we
where, in the third equation, we have used that e (r) is independent of " 1 (r) and R is independent of (" 1 (r); e (r) 0 ) for every r. This proves (18) . Consider next the proof of (19) . Similarly to (29), we obtain
where we used that e " 1 (r) is independent of " 1 (r) and R is independent of (" 1 (r);
e " 2 (r)). From (9) and the rule of double expectation, we obtain
where, in the last equality, we used (30) and the summation restriction (16) . This completes the proof of (19) . (17) 
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